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Abstrak: al-Bid‘ah versus al-Mashlahah al-Mursalah dan al-Istihsân: Kerangka Hukum al-Syâthibî. Tulisan 
ini mengkaji pandangan Abû Ishâq al-Shâthibî (w. 790/1388) tentang bidah versus al-mashlahah al-mursalah  dan 
al-istihsân. Karya al-Syâthibî tentang konsep bidah dalam kitabnya, al-I'tishâm, sebagai respons terhadap ulama di 
zamannya yang menganggap bahwa al-mashlahah al-mursalah dan al-istihsân sebagai bentuk inovasi (al-bid‘ah). 
Tulisan ini akan mengelaborasi signifikansi gagasan al-Syâthibî dalam isu bidah yang memformulasikan kerangka 
syariah berbasis teks dan rasio dengan non-syariah. Pembahasan tentang bidah sebagai perbuatan yang bertentangan 
dengan prinsip syariah akan dianalisis dengan prinsip legalitas al-mashlahah al-mursalah  dan al-istihsân sebagai bagian 
dari metodologi penggalian hukum setelah Alquran, Sunah, ijmak, dan qiyâs. Tulisan ini juga ingin menguraikan 
keunggulan al-Syâthibî dalam epistemologi hukum dibanding ulama lain yang membahas isu serupa.
Kata Kunci: al-istihsân, bidah, al-mashlahah al-mursalah, faqîh, teori hukum   
Abstract: al-Bid‘ah versus al-Mashlahah al-Mursalah and al-Istihsân: Al-Syâthibî’s Legal Framework. This paper 
discusses with the juridical basis of Abû Ishâq al-Shâthibi’s (d. 790/1388) argument against those who considered 
al-mashlahah al-mursalah  (public interest) and al-istihsân (juristic preference) to be forms of innovation. The present 
discussion will examine the efficacy of al-Syâthibî’s distinction between al-bid‘ah (innovation), which is foreign and 
even contradictory to the shariah and the validity of the legal principles of al-mashlahah al-mursalah  and al-istihsân 
as subsidiary, yet valid sources of law under the Quran, the Sunnah, ijmâ’, and qiyâs (ratio legis). In addition, it will 
be shown how al-Syâthibî’s epistemological reliance on legal theory distinguished him from jurists who shared quite 
different views on the same matter. In the concluding remarks, the relevance of this theory with contemporary Muslim 
society with respect to pursuing legal practices is underlined.
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Introduction
In order to avoid innovations which are not pre-
ordained in the divined law, the Prophet has advocated 
Muslim to strongly be committed to his Sunnah and 
following his example. In making all acts are firmly 
guided by the Prophet, the Sunnah of Prophet informed 
us which is narrated by Muslim from Jâbir ibn ‘Abd Allâh, 
“Allah’s Messenger would  say  in  his  sermon, “The best 
of statements is (from) the Book of  Allah  and  the  best 
of guidance is the guidance of  Muhammad.  The worst 
of matters  are  innovations  and  all  innovations are al-
bid‘ah (heresy) and all al-bid‘ah leads to misguidance.”1 
This statement is very predominantly acknowledged as 
the foundation of censuring al-bid‘ah.
The essence of innovation is the creation of some-
 1 Shahîh Muslim, Book of Friday Prayer, Hadith No. 1435.
thing that has no precedence or any evidence as to 
its existence. In the Quran, it is said that Allah is al-
Badî‘ (The Originator) because He created  this world 
without there being anything similar to it before, 
“The Originator of the heavens and  the earth. When 
he decrees a matter, he only says to it: ‘Be!’–and it is” 
(Q.s. [2]: 117). The Prophet said, “Whoever innovates 
something concerning our affairs, which has nothing 
to do with us, is indeed rejected.” Similarly, he said, 
“Whoever  carries  out  an  action  that  we  have  not 
ordered  is  indeed  rejected.” Both Hadiths declare a 
censure against al-bid‘ah: the first with regards to its 
innovation and the second with regards to its acceptance 
and implementation.2  
 2 Aslam Farouk Ali, “A Translation of Muhammad al-Ghazali’s 
Study on Bid’a with an Introduction on Author and His Thought” 
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In comparing between religious matters and the 
mundane ones, Najm al-Dîn at-Tûfî said:
“We only consider the public welfare in matters of 
conduct and not in  matters  of  worship  and  the  like, 
because  these  fall  within  the  rights  of  the  Lawgiver 
and  are  specific  to  Him.  It  is  not  possible  to  have 
knowledge  of  His rights,  in  relation  to  time,  space, 
quantity, etc., except as He has directed and the servant 
is therefore compelled to comply to the  stipulations 
set by Him. This is because a slave is only regarded as 
obedient if he complies with the directions of his master 
and does only that which he knows will please him. This 
is exactly the  case  here;  when  philosophers  rejected 
the  law  and  approached  religious  devotion  as  an 
application of their intellects, they incurred the wrath 
of Allah and were misled and led others  astray. This is, 
however, not the case with commissioned right, as these 
concern political rulings implemented for the general 
welfare and determined by it.”3  
This means that whatever outside religious matters 
albeit having no precedence and the text is silence on it 
are not al-bid‘ah.
‘Izz al-Dîn ibn ‘Abd al-Salâm stated in relation to 
this, “Whoever considers the general purposes of the 
law, which are based on the obtaining of welfare and the 
repelling of perversity, realizes that it is not permissible 
to be lax in obtaining welfare or in overlooking per-
versity even if it is not stipulated by ijmâ' or qiyâs or 
any specific text; the understanding of the law makes 
this an obligation.” This statement can be inferred that 
enactments dealing with acts of worship  is  not  the 
same as enactments dealing with mundane and social 
conducts. The Lawgiver takes the  responsibility  of 
stipulating  the  realities  of  worship  with  regard  to 
form,  time,  place,  quantity,  method,  what  is  general 
and what is specific, etc. This is specified by His wisdom 
and there is no room for the exertion of our own opinions; 
we are only required to fulfill these obligations. The acts 
of worship should remain the same as they have been 
from the era of the Prophet (Saw.) to the end of time, 
with no difference between our predecessors and the 
generations to come. Complete compliance has to be 
shown in this matter, from beginning to end.4 The rules 
of maslahah mursalah and istihsan are served to respond 
such debating opinions.
From the standpoint of their lack of an explicit 
textual basis in the nash, al-bid‘ah, al-mashlahah al-
mursalah, and al-istihsân are similar. The former was 
censured by the Sunnah due to its violation of religion, 
although there was an assumption on the part of scholars 
that al-bid‘ah could be good or bad. Al-mashlahah al-
mursalah, however, was regarded as a legal argument, 
(MA Thesis at University of South Africa, 2010), p. 127.
 3 Aslam Farouk Ali, “A Translation”, p. 131.
 4 Aslam Farouk Ali, “A Translation”, p. 131.
even though the text did not elaborate explicitly on 
its commandments and prohibitions. Due to endless 
polemics over these two terms, it is necessary for our 
purpose to examine them from the angle of legal theory 
and especially with respect to al-Syâthibî’s argument. 
Like al-mashlahah al-mursalah, al-istihsân generally 
is accepted as a subsidiary source of law in Islamic 
jurisprudence, though its position is still opposed by 
some jurists, such as the Syâfi’îtes. What is important 
for our purpose however is al-Syâthibî’s view on al-
istihsân in connection with al-bid‘ah.
Al-Syâthibî’s Concept of al-Bid‘ah versus al-
Mashlahah al-Mursalah
At first glance al-bid‘ah denotes to some things new 
or creating a thing that never existed before. It may 
cover religious as well as mundane matters. Al-Syâthibî 
censured al-bid‘ah in a universal sense (kulliyyah) and 
rejected the possibility that there could be such a thing 
as good or bad al-bid‘ah. He, however, believed that al-
bid‘ah could only be condoned in matters not attested 
to in the Quran and the Sunnah. Al-mashlahah al-
mursalah  (public interest), on the other hand, although 
not rooted in a certain dalil (indicant), was regarded 
by al-Syâthibî as legal and in no way to be counted as 
al-bid‘ah. Yet he acknowledged that the validity of al-
mashlahah al-mursalah is disputed by jurists.5 In this 
section we will discuss the argument of al-Syâthibî 
against those who deemed al-mashlahah al-mursalah an 
example of good al-bid‘ah (al-bid‘ah al-hasanah).6
Before we discuss further on the concept of al-
mashlahah developed by al-Syâthibî, we need firstly 
analyze the formulae of al-mashlahah developed by 
some jurists before him. It attempts to highlight the 
ramifications of Syâthibî’s approach which may offer 
a different paradigm in coming to a legal solution for 
the cases that have no precedence in the Quran nor the 
Sunnah.
The limit of Islamic jurisprudence in solving the 
cases at hand and the silence of the Quran and the 
Sunnah on a variety of social problems forces Muslim 
jurists to exert their efforts in finding legal solutions by 
reconciling the dilemmatic and ambiguous issues in the 
field of religious-cum ritual matters on the one hand and 
the benefit of social affairs on the other. Doing ijtihâd 
is one alternative to be exercised by circumventing the 
legal corpus (fiqh) and its methodology. The practice 
of ijtihâd as a principal means for reviving Islamic law, 
increasing its flexibility, and adapting it to contemporary 
needs of Muslim societies is the area of legal theory in 
5 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, ed. Muhammad Rashîd Ridhâ (al-
Qâhirah, Maktabah al-Tijâriyyah al-Kubrâ, n. d), vol. 2, p. 111.
6 Al-Syâthibi, al-I‘tishâm, p. 111.
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which the concept of al-mashlahah was discussed.7 The 
use of al-mashlahah, first introduced through the word 
al-istishlâh, was created by Mâlikîte school.8
The more comprehensive development of the con-
cept of al-mashlahah in Islamic legal theory was then 
introduced by Syâfi’î jurist Abû Hâmid Muhammad al-
Ghazâlî (d. 505/1111). His paradigm of al-mashlahah 
inspires many jurists in the latter development of Islamic 
legal theory to which the al-mashlahah edifice came 
at its excellent elaboration in the hand of Abû Ishâq 
al-Syâthibî (d. 790/1388). Al-Ghazâlî argued that al-
mashlahah was God’s purpose (maqshad, pl. maqâshid) 
in revealing the divine law, and, more concretely, that 
this intention was to preserve for humankind the five 
essential elements of their well-being, namely their 
religion, life, intellect, offspring, and property. What 
protects these essential elements and averts them harm 
al-Ghazâlî considered a mashlahah and what fails to do 
so is its opposite, namely mafsadah.9 The introduction of 
al-mashlahah, or al-mashlahah al-mursalah which lacks 
concrete indications in the Quran, the Sunnah, and 
ijmâ’, was likely reconciled as approaches on the position 
of revealed law and the reason behind why the Asy’ârite 
and Mu‘tazilîte concluded something as either bad or 
right. The former sees that right and wrong can only 
be justified by the revealed law, while the latter leaves 
that determination as a result of human intellect.10 Al-
Mashlahah, in Ghazalî’s eyes, is preponderance over the 
text once there is a certainty (qath’î) of general necessity 
(dharûrî) for all community (kullî) (religion, life, 
intellect, offspring and property). Whatever constituted 
merely a need (hâjah) or improve-ment (tahsîn) with 
respect to these elements was un-acceptable to al-
Ghazâlî without concrete reference within the Quran 
or the Sunnah.11
The most liberal breakthrough of adopting al-
mashlahah as a legal solution which differed from the 
above Muslim jurists was al-Tûfî’s concept. Al-Tûfî (d. 
716/1316), a Hanbalite jurist, employed al-mashlahah 
on the basis of substantive rationality, rejecting the 
formal procedure and categories such as necessity 
(dharûrî), need (hâjî) and (tahsînî) improvement. He 
underscores al-mashlahah as being an independent 
criterion for deriving rulings. According to al-Tûfî, 
anything that brought about al-mashlahah or averted 
harm was commensurate with the purposes of the law. 
In order to adapt the law according to circumstances, 
7 Felicitas Opwis,”Al-Mashlahah in Contemporary Islamic Legal 
Theory” (2005) 12(2) Islamic Law and Society 182, 187.
8 Opwis, Islamic Law and Society, 188.
9  Opwis, above n 7, 188; Muhammad al-Ghazâlî, al-Mustashfâ 
min ‘Ilm al-Ushûl (1993) vol. 2, 481-2, 502-3.
10 Opwis, above n 7, 189-90
11 Opwis, ”Al-Mashlahah,” p. 194.
al-Tûfî argued that a ruling entailing al-mashlahah 
should receive priority over a contradictory ruling, be 
it scriptural or not. He limited the supremacy of al-
mashlahah in the law-finding process by excluding acts 
of worship (‘ibâdât) from its purview and by stipulating 
that al-mashlahah could neither override fixed textual 
injunctions (muqaddarât) nor a specific indicant (dalîl 
khâsh) from the Quran, the Sunnah, or consensus.12
Abû Ishâq al-Syâthibî deals with al-mashlahah by 
referring firstly to the fundamental ground of Meccan 
and Medinan suras in the Quran. He argued that the 
Meccan suras embody the general message of Islam in 
which the universal sources of the law are laid down. 
The Medinan suras, as well as the Sunnah, constitute 
the particulars of the law that elucidate, specify, qualify 
or complement the earlier sura of the Quran: 49 He 
considered the universal sources of the law to be certain 
and immutable whereas the particulars of the Quran and 
the Sunnah were probable and subject to change. For al-
Syâthibî, attaining al-mashlahah and averting mafsadah 
at the level of necessities, needs, and improvements was 
a universal source of the law. A situation that lacked 
textual evidence could be judged as to its conformity 
with the law by evaluating its al-mashlahah. In case a 
particular ruling from the Quran or the Sunnah stood 
in opposition to a universal source, i.e. al-mashlahah, 
al-Shãtibi gave preponderance to the universal sour-
ce. However, he did not consider al-mashlahah to be 
weightier in every instance. Exempted were those 
particular rulings that constituted legal licenses (ru-
khash) or specifications (takhshîsh). In addition, con-
siderations of al-mashlahah had no bearing on acts of 
worship (‘ibâdâh), acts that happened or could have 
happened during the lifetime of the Prophet and that 
had received a ruling, and the continuous practice of the 
early islamic community. Any other act may be judged 
according to the mashlahah it entails under particular 
circumstances, which, of course, varies by place, time, 
and person. Al-Shãtibi’s theory provided jurists with a 
comprehensive system to extend and adapt the law to 
new circumstances.13
Some scholars such as Vardit Rispler14 have argued 
that the concept of good and bad al-bid‘ah developed 
as a parallel system to the shariah. While it is true that 
12 Opwis, above n 7, 195.
13 Opwis, ”Al-Mashlahah,” p. 196.
14 Vardit Rispler, “Toward a New Understanding of the Term 
Bid‘a,” Der Islam, 68, 2 (1991), 320-328. Rispler stated that “in order 
to open the stagnant development of Islamic law, the classification 
of bid‘a into good and bad is made possible to serve as a parallel to 
the shariah. While in fact, for  our understanding al-bid‘ah itself is 
not a juridical edifice of system like al-mashlahah mursala stood and 
derived the conclusion from the shariah matters when the textual basis 
is absence. On the contrary, bid‘a is a doctrine in which theologically it 
is censured by the Prophetic tradition. 
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some early scholars classified al-bid‘ah into good and 
bad, this position of course contradicts al-Syâthibî’s 
belief that any such classification is legally week. He 
felt that its justification was purely based on rational 
(and therefore arbitrary) rather than legal point of 
view. This was not however the case in his eyes with 
al-mashlahah al-mursalah  and al-istihsân,  which were 
fully integrated by his time within juridical of the 
Mâlikîte and Hanafîte schools. Thus principles such as 
al-mashlahah al-mursalah can be used in instances where 
the Quran, the Sunnah, ijmâ’, and qiyâs (ratio legis) fail 
to yield an answer. In other words, there is no legal or 
logical reason for the use of good or bad al-bid‘ah as 
a foundation for juridical arguments when there is no 
need to do so. For, unlike al-bid‘ah, al-mashlahah al-
mursalah is legally guaranteed as the outcome of ijtihâd, 
which by definition recognizes the superiority of the 
shariah.
Al-mashlahah al-mursalah  is in fact essential to the 
correct functioning of the law. The rulings which are 
incumbent upon Muslims cannot all be traced back 
to the Quran, the Sunnah, ijmâ’ (consensus), or qiyâs 
(ratio legis), since many rulings are unspecific in terms 
of either commands or prohibitions. Al-mashlahah al-
mursalah  is in this sense very different from al-bid‘ah. 
The former is employed to arrive at rulings, based on 
certain indicants, and in deriving legal judgements,15 
while the latter consists in creating a ruling without any 
precedent or textual basis.
While al-mashlahah al-mursalah is used to imple-
ment al-mashlahah (general good) for human beings 
when there is no clear stipulation in the text, this alone 
cannot serve as its only claim to authenticity. This is 
because its arbitrary use will result in reliance on rational 
standards and the inevitable introduction of innovation. 
Therefore, the function of the general good should be 
based as much as possible on its conformity with the 
ratio legis or its suitability. In other words, al-mashlahah 
can be made to function in order to preclude unlawful 
innovative actions as long as the constraint of necessity 
(dharûrî) exists. Al-Âmidî (d. 630/1232), for example, 
asserts that “this does not mean that every al-mashlahah 
(general good) is accepted as the basis of rulings; rather it 
means that mashâlih (sing. al-mashlahah) can be resorted 
to only where necessity is clear cut and universal”.16 
Referring to such discourse one should keep in mind 
about the paradigmatic definition and root of sources 
of law which may restrict an arbitrary conclusion of 
every case that may be made. Both al-mashlahah al-
mursalah and al-bid‘ah can be used as an instrument 
15 Abû al-Hasan ‘Alî Sayf al-Dîn al-Âmidî, al-Ihkâm fî Ushûl al-
Ahkâm (1968) vol 4, 37-38.
16 Al-Âmidi, al-Ihkâm, IV, p. 215-6.
to justify everything as legal or valid once the two are 
put as the equal form of legal basis for coming to the 
rulings having no precedents in both the Quran and 
the Sunnah. The difference between al-mashlahah al-
mursalah and al-bid‘ah is substantially rooted in the 
indicants and the ends of the shariah. Al-mashlahah 
al-mursalah, al-Syâthibî contends, is principally based 
on the indicants of the shariah by which the aim of 
the latter, i.e., promoting benefit and averting harm, 
are maintained.17 For if al-mashlahah al-mursalah is not 
rooted in a dalil, this means that one is construing Syar‘î 
matters as good or bad based merely on reason, which 
is prohibited. Mâlik (d. 179/795), the outstanding 
proponent of al-mashlahah al-mursalah, insisted on 
adjudicating matters on the basis of the Shariah, not 
merely reason. The shariah, al-Syâthibî asserts, never 
tolerates al-bid‘ah at all, for there is no good al-bid‘ah 
tolerable to the Shariah. On the contrary, pointing to 
the universality of the censure of al-bid‘ah (“every al-
bid‘ah is error and every error is in hell”), al-Syâthibî 
concludes that all al-bid‘ah is blameworthy.18
As al-mashlahah al-mursalah  is a legal principle used 
when the dalil in the nash is absent, al-Syâthibî makes 
clear distinction between the domains of ‘ibâdah and 
adiyyah (customs), insisting that the former are illogical 
and required an intention (niyyah) while the latter are 
entirely logical and need not be prefaced by an intention 
(niyyah). Therefore, al-bid‘ah in a general sense, al-
Syâthibî contends, consists in the habitual performance 
of acts pertaining to ibâdah (religious matters) and 
aimed at association with divine law (masyrû’) which are 
not sanctioned by the Quran or the Sunnah.19  Thus all 
behavior tied merely to customary matters can legally 
resort to al-mashlahah al-mursalah.
In making this distinction, al-Syâthibî stands out, in 
my opinion, from other jurists.20 He clearly differentiates 
between cases related to public interests (al-mashlahah 
al-mursalah) and al-bid‘ah itself. Of course the former 
is arrived at through the exercise of ijtihâd as it is the 
latter. But when it comes to the division al-bid‘ah into 
good and bad21 or the application to its juridical values, 
like wâjib (obligation) and mandûb (permissible) as al-
Syâthibî rejects it is baseless, since such value judgment 
17 Hammâdî al-‘Ubaydî, al-Syâthibî wa Maqâshid al-Syarî‘ah, 
(1992), 228-9.
18 Al-‘Ubaydî, al-Syâthibî, p. 229.
19 Al-‘Ubaydî, al-Syâthibî, p. 230.
20 Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jâbirî, al-Dîn wa al-Dawlah wa Tathbîq al-
Syarî‘ah (1996), 31-132. 
21 The Indian reformer Syaykh Ahmad Sirhindî (d. 1034/1624) 
launches vigorous attacks against the distinction between good and 
bad bid’a. He insists that either of them is away from the Sunnah and 
therefore should be scrupulously avoided. Yohanan Friedman, Syaykh 
Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outline of His Thought and A Study of His Image in 
the Eyes of Posterity (1971), 43-44. 
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in this case is purely arbitrary. The five legal values, after 
all, are based objectively on the shariah and are regarded 
as a legal obligation (taklîf) for one who possesses a sound 
mind (mukallaf). They also carry with the certainty of 
the shariah.22 Al-bid‘ah, however, if divided into rulings 
by analogy, is ambivalent whether logically or legally. 
Logically speaking, if it is reasonable that it should be so 
divided, how can the censure of al-bid‘ah as error (kull 
al-bid‘ah dhalâlah) in essence be substantiated? Legally 
speaking, on the other hand, rulings are related to 
rewards from God, whereas the warning of the calamity 
of al-bid‘ah itself is universal. Therefore, innovation is 
undoubtedly a violation of the shariah, whereas novelty 
in mundane affairs falls under the heading of public 
interest (al-mashlahah al-mursalah), not under al-bid‘ah 
wâjibah or al-bid‘ah mandûbah.23 
It would appear that the weakness in the reasoning 
behind the division of al-bid‘ah into legal values is not 
only in its nature contradictory, but also in its tendency 
to introduce ambiguity into legal argument. Wâjib 
(obligation), for instance, if attached to al-bid‘ah, yields 
al-bid‘ah al-wâjibah, which consequently entails the 
legal norm of obligation.24 Al-bid‘ah, however, is itself 
epistemologically censured based on the aforementioned 
Prophetic report. Therefore, it is misleading to qualify 
al-bid‘ah by one of the legal norms such as obligation. 
For, obligation (wâjib) as a legal norm represents “an act 
whose performance entails rewards, and whose omission 
entails punishment”.25 Obviously, the argument over 
whether al-bid‘ah can be wâjib or mandûb is debatable 
from both theological and legal perspectives. All this 
goes to show that there is a gulf between al-bid‘ah and 
al-mashlahah al-mursalah  in the eyes al-Syâthibî.
To demonstrate how al-bid‘ah is unacceptable in 
law and al-mashlahah al-mursalah allowed, al-Syâthibî 
develops his own theory in distinguishing between the 
two. He starts by assigning three conditions which al-
mashlahah must fulfill in order to be considered valid. 
First, al-mashlahah is attested to by the shariah in 
virtue of its essential suitability and epistemology. This 
is what lends it authenticity. Furthermore, there is no 
indication that there was any disagreement over this fact. 
Otherwise, al-Syâthibî says, al-mashlahah would mean 
contradicting the shariah. One example of al-mashlahah 
at work is in the ordinance of penal retaliation (qishâsh) 
which is applied in order to safeguard life (hifzh al-
nafs).
22 Al-Syâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, I, 76-81.
23 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, I, 192-7.
24 Ibid, 192. Al-Syâthibî contends that importing legal norms into 
al-bid‘ah is itself innovation. Al-bid‘ah does not tolerate or amalgamated 
selection (takhyîr); but it is prohibited all together.
25 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of  Islamic Legal Theories An Introduction 
to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (1997), 40-41.
Second, if there is a clear indicant of the shariah 
rejecting it, al-mashlahah is clearly invalid. This is be-
cause its suitability (munâsabah) or lack of it is not 
seen from the standpoint of human reason perse, but 
rather in terms of the indicants (adillah, sing. dalîl) of 
the shariah. Thus, al-Syâthibî insists, “the meaning of 
al-mashlahah for us is based on the rationality of its 
function, in which benefits to mankind are promoted 
and harms averted; therefore, the capacity of reason in 
its understanding is dependent on the shariah. On the 
other hand, if it is not attested to by the shariah in its 
commission and omission, the agreement of Muslims is 
applied for its rejection.”26
Third, the use of al-mashlahah is allowable if the syar‘î 
indicant neither points to its acceptance nor rejects it. 
In any such case, says al-Syâthibî, al-al-mashlahah must 
meet two conditions to be valid: (a) The case should relay 
on the indicants of the text in which the suitability is 
maintained. For instance, someone guilty of murdering 
the person from whom he or she stands to inherit is 
barred from receiving this or her proportion of the 
inheritance. (b) There should be a suitability between 
the case and the rational meaning of the shariah, even 
though in fact it may not be sustained by a certain dalîl 
(indicant). In such instances, al-Syâthibî asserts, this 
process is called the act of al-mashâlih al-mursalah (pl. 
of al-mashlahah).27 
Al-Syâthibî’s marriage of reason and the shariah 
in order to make the law more dynamic on the one 
hand, while preserving its authenticity on the other, is 
quite brilliant. Although he employs al-mashlahah al-
mursalah as a legal principle when the nash is silent, he 
appears to differ from his predecessors such as Najm 
al-Dîn al-Tûfî (d. 716), whose theory of al-mashlahah 
is more utilitarian and tends towards liberalism.28 Al-
Syâthibî insists that the shariah is still superior to reason 
a fact that ensures that mankind will not indulge in 
innovation when precedent cannot be found in the nash. 
Al-Tûfî as we have noted, is much more liberal in his 
employment of al-mashlahah. For example, he considers 
al-mashlahah applicable to all mundane matters, such 
as mu‘âmalah (social relations), whether attested to or 
not in the nash. However, he rejects its use in matter of 
‘ibâdah, which are clearly spelled out in the nash.29  The 
26 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, 2, 113.
27 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, 2, p. 114-115.
28 Religious utilitarianism and liberalism borrowed from Hallaq 
indicate the function of Islamic law as merely seen for the benefit 
of mankind in this world for public interest and also sometimes are 
manipulated for personal advantages. In the end, religious principles 
are only seen as substantive assumption. See Hallaq, above n 25,  214-
216, 231-233.
29 Muhammad Musthafâ Syalabî, Ta‘lîl  al-Ahkâm, (1947), 292-
293.
Ahkam: Vol. XII No.1 Januari 20126
mujtahid, he says, undertakes his inquiry for the 
benefit and on behalf of those who are mukallafîn 
(who possess a sound mind). In other words, he saw 
al-mashlahah as “promoting benefit and averting harm 
(jalb naf ’ aw daf ’ dharar) for the good of mankind in 
this world and in the hereafter.30 
Before elucidating his main argument in support 
of al-mashlahah as an acceptable source of law, al-
Tûfî tries to explain how the notion was interpreted 
by al-Qarâfî and al-Ghazâlî. The former divided al-
mashlahah into three types. First, al-mashlahah which 
is similar to qiyâs in that the rulings of law can be 
derived through the ratio legis from the nash; Second, 
al-mashlahah which is irrelevant and contradicts the 
nash; and finally, al-mashlahah al-mursalah, for which 
the indication of its rejection or acceptance is not 
clear in the nash. Al-Ghazâlî, however, asserted that 
al-mashlahah functioned according to the category of 
dharûrî (necessity). Al-Tûfî, then, concludes that al-
mashlahah is not precluded but is even used according 
to the demands of ijtihâd. For, he reasons, if al-
mashlahah is omitted, ijtihâd automatically becomes 
void. His theory of al-mashlahah, however, is only 
applicable to mundane matters (customs), whereas 
‘ibâdah are certain and fall under the prerogative of 
God.31
The concept of al-mashlahah promulgated by al-
Tûfî, however, is perhaps too liberal. He, for example, 
sets aside the three sources of law (the Quran, the 
Sunnah, and Ijmâ’) in favor of the Prophetic report 
“do not inflict injury or repay one injury with 
another” (lâ dharar wa lâ dhirâr),32 in supporting 
his theory of al-mashlahah.33 In short, if we compare 
it to al-Syâthibî’s theory of al-mashlahah, which is 
predicated on the ends of the shariah itself, al-Tûfî 
seemingly acknowledges the supremacy of reason in 
cases of public interest. 
30 Najm al-Dîn al-Tûfî, Syarh Mukhtashar al-Rawdhah, ed. ‘Abd 
Allâh b. ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Turki (1989), vol 3, 204.
31 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence 
(1991), 275.
32 Nazly Hanum Lubis,”al-Tufi’s Concept of al-Mashlahah: 
A Study in Islamic Legal Theory” (MA Thesis, McGill University, 
1995),  47-50.
33 Hallaq, above n 25, 150-53. Hallaq argues that al-Tûfî employs 
the concept of al-mashlahah superseding consensus, even the Quran 
and the Sunnah, by maintaining three reasons. First, the efficacy of al-
mashlahah is in agreement among all mankind, while consensus and 
its authoritativeness are subject to disagreement. Second, the textual 
evidence in the Quran, the Sunnah, and consensus is varied and at 
time contradictory, leading to sever disagreement among jurists. Al-
mashlahah, however, is subject to no disagreement. Third, historical 
evidence shows that the Companions abandoned the evidence of the 
texts in favor of public interest arrived at by their own opinion. 
The efficacy of al-mashlahah, according to al-
Syâthibî, is certain and is essentially different from the 
adjudication of cases by reason. For, as he frequently 
states, the seeds of al-bid‘ah stem from its reliance 
on rational judgment which sets aside Shariah 
justifications. Judgment based merely on reason, if 
applied to syar‘î matters, leads to prime al-bid‘ah.34
He defines al-bid‘ah as “an invented way in religion 
that resembles the way of Shariah.” He comments that 
al-bid‘ah commonly occurs in the area of rituals but 
can also occur in the general area of dealings (al-a‘mâl 
al-’âdiyyah). With reference to rituals, for example, he 
cites exaggeration in the performance of rituals. It can 
also include disregarding or neglecting certain other 
aspects of shariah such as refraining from marriage. 
This difference, between the two concepts of ‘âdah 
and al-bid‘ah underlies al-Syâthibî’s approach not only 
toward the particular issue of custom but toward legal 
theory and interpretation in general. In al-Syâthibî’s 
framework, ‘âdah acquires a positive legal connotation; 
it is to be approved and considered by the jurists. Al-
bid‘ah, on the other hand, is the opposite of ‘âdah in 
the sense that it bypasses the limits of shariah or even 
disregards it altogether. In other words, if a certain 
practice, habit, or custom is approved by Shariah 
either directly through the text or indirectly by being 
in line with its spirit, it is to be approved as a good 
practice (‘âdah), otherwise, it should be discarded as 
an unfounded innovation. 35 He explains that this 
distinction between rituals and habits with reference 
to either ta‘abbud (faith-based acceptance) or ta‘lîl 
(identifying the objectives of a given action) is crucial 
in light of the discussions about legal principles such 
as public interest (al-mashlahah al-mursalah) and 
juristic preference (al-istihsân).36 
To support his idea of the difference between 
al-mashlahah al-mursalah and al-bid‘ah, al-Syâthibî 
cites ten examples of al-mashlahah introduced by the 
Companions and pious ‘ulamâ’ in response to cases not 
clearly mentioned either in the Sunnah or the Quran. 
For our purposes, we shall look at the five examples 
which al-Syâthibî elaborates upon in particular. First, 
there is the agreement of the Companion on the 
compilation of the Quran in order to preserve it for 
posterity. This action was obviously neither assigned 
by the Prophet nor attested to in the Quranic 
34 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, I, 359. 
35 Ayman Shabana, “‘Urf and ‘Adah within the Framework al-
Shabiti’s Legal Methodology" (2007) UCLA Journal of Islamic and 
Near Eastern Law Review, 87, 89-90.
36 Shabana, “‘Urf and ‘Adah”, p. 98.
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injunctions. Second, there is the prison sentence set 
for a person accused of a crime, even though prison is 
usually reserved for someone who has been convicted. 
Fourth, there is the ruling that a person may be 
employed as the great imam (al-imâm al-kubrâ), 
even though he may not be qualified as a mujtahid 
or muftî, due to the lack of a qualified candidate for 
this position. Fifth, there is the agreement reached 
by the majority of ulama on suspending the penalty 
for taking property/wealth (mâl) when there is great 
exigency for it in Muslim society.37  
The aforementioned examples, quoted by al-
Syâthibî to support his views on the validity of al-
mashlahah al-mursalah, are all issues that are not 
clearly referred to in the texts. They are all, however, 
categorized as public interest (al-mashlahah al-
mursalah) where their compatibility with the ends of 
the law (maqâshid al-syarî‘ah) is unequivocal. 
Before passing judgement on the fact that al-
mashlahah al-mursalah  is different from al-bid‘ah, 
al-Syâthibî declares that public interest was always 
given the highest consideration by the Companions. 
The compilation of the Quran, for example, was 
not commanded by the Prophet. Instead, though 
it was not ordained by the nash, the Companions 
took the initiative for the sake of public interest, 
making it therefore lawful. Furthermore, al-Syâthibî’s 
justification of public interest is limited to ‘adiyyât 
(customs) and excludes ‘ibâdah.38 Al-Syâthibî in these 
instances probably intended to make the law flexible 
enough to meet the demands of human beings within 
the constraints of the means (wasâ’il) of achieving the 
ends of the shariah (maqâshid al-syarî‘ah). The ends 
of the shariah itself, however, are crucial to preserving 
the authenticity of the law and to ensuring that the 
benefits to mankind in this world and in the hereafter 
are maintained. In support of this he quotes the 
saying of Hûdzayfah “every ‘ibâdah not performed by 
the companions is null and void… and take the path 
of your predecessors.”
Still on the topic of the essence of public interest, 
al-Syâthibî insists that the systematization of Arabic 
grammar (‘ilm al-nahw) be typified as al-mashlahah, 
not al-bid‘ah wâjibah as proposed by ‘Izz al-Dîn b. 
‘Abd al-Salâm (d. 660).39 Arguing against ‘Izz al-Dîn’s 
position, al-Syâthibî insists that its introduction was 
not based on evidence either from the Quran or the 
37 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, 115-27.
38 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 131-132.
39 ‘Izz al-Dîn b ‘Abd al-Salâm, Qawâ‘id al-Ahkâm fi Mashâlih 
al-Anâm, vol 2, 173.
Sunnah. Rather, al-Syâthibî categorizes such practices 
on the part of his predecessors as a necessity (dharûrî) 
in the field of the means (wasâ’il), and not that of 
the maqâshid (the ends), of the shariah.40 Al-Syâthibî, 
furthermore, asserts that cases involving customs 
(‘adiyyâh) have their basis in reason, such that their 
benefit or harm can be understood logically. Provided, 
he reminds us, the application of al-mashlahah al-
mursalah  should be in line with the ends of the shariah 
and that does not contradict the roots of the law.41
This advanced theory of the law which protects 
the benefits of the servant of God (mashâlih al-‘ibâd) 
is also put forward by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah 
(d. 751/1350). Ibn al-Qayyim contends that fatwas 
can change according to changes of place, time and 
condition. In his mind, the Shariah itself operates for 
the benefit of mankind in this world and the hereafter 
on the basis of rahmah (God blessing), mashlahah and 
hikmah (wisdom of God). None of these, he insists, 
leads mankind into hardship. 
From the examples cited above, al-Syâthibî comes 
to a conclusion which has certain ramification for 
his legal theory. For him, mashlahah as practiced by 
his forefathers (such as Companions) has two facets. 
First, its conformity with the ends of the Shariah does 
not fundamentally contradict its roots (ushûl) or its 
indicants (dalâ’il, pl. dalîl). Second, public interest 
deals with matters rationally understandable and 
touching specifically on customs (‘adiyyâh) are lawful. 
This is because customs are unlike ‘ibâdah which are 
transcendent and incapable of rationalization–examples 
being, according to al-Syâthibî, wudhû’ (ablution) 
and hajj (pilgrimage).42 Both ritual practices can only 
be performed and taken for granted. To distinguish 
the fundamental bases of ‘ibâdah (which are beyond 
human reason) and of ‘adiyyât (which are accessible to 
human intellect), al-Syâthibî positions himself in the 
tradition of the Mu’tazilîtes43 in claiming that reason 
has no place in the domain of ‘ibâdah. This is because 
‘ibâdah (like ablution, for instance, which is irrational) 
are taken for granted as submission to God, he insists. 
Cleansing oneself after menstruation, for example, is 
equivalent to submission (ta’abbud). Therefore, ijtihâd 
40 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 133-34.
41 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 133.
42 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 129.
43 Mu’tazilites argue that reason ineluctably brings humans to a 
knowledge of God and thus to the knowledge that what the Quran 
and the Sunnah require of humans (taklif ) is good. Richard C 
Martin, R Mark Woodward and Dwi S Atmaja, Defenders of Reason 
in Islam Mu ‘tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol (1997) 
, 17.
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has no business in trying to understand any hidden 
meanings in ‘ibâdah. On the contrary, the objections 
of ‘adiyyah (customs) are clear, i.e. to preserve benefits 
(masalahih) and avoid harms (mafâsid), whereas those 
of ‘ibâdah matters are unclear.44 In other words, al-
Syâthibî insists that ‘ibâdah, being certain and perfect, 
need neither addition nor substraction, while ‘adiyyah 
are rational and may be modified according to necessity 
and need. Deviations in the performance of ‘ibâdah 
which are alien or not attested to by a syar‘î indicant 
are counted as real al-bid‘ah, and therefore are to be 
absolutely rejected. 
Al-mashlahah al-mursalah, therefore, amounts to 
protecting the constraints of dharuri (necessity) and 
averting difficulty in religion. In stating this, al-Syâthibî 
contends that a certain element (probably al-mashlahah 
al-mursalah) should be included in a relevant case if its 
exclusion might otherwise lead to imperfection. This 
theory, known as mâ lâ yatim al-wâjib illâ bih, is an 
indispensible facet of the means of pursuing the ends 
(maqâshid), rather than constituting innovation. The 
philosophical basis of this outlook is intended to avert 
hardship.45
Al-Syâthibî agrees that there is a suitability in the 
maqashid, which constitutes of necessity, need and 
improvement, which function as a kind of human 
attempt at understanding the shariah. The suitability 
of these ends is unequivocally in line with the roots 
of universality (ushûl al-kulliyyât), which ensure that 
the benefits in this world and in the hereafter will not 
transgress these limits. Such constraints and limitations, 
al-Syâthibî46 insists, are not only described in the Quran 
but also elaborated in the Sunnah. This foundation 
ensures that as long as there is textual evidence in the 
Quran and the Sunnah applicable legal rulings should 
always be taken as the basis of an argument not reason 
alone. If a certain textual basis of the shariah is silent, the 
employment of al-mashlahah al-mursalah is acceptable 
as longs as it conforms to the ends of the Shariah and 
their indicants (dalâ’il, pl. dalîl).47  This position shows 
that the superior of the shariah to reason helps to protect 
the community from adjudication of matters leading 
to al-bid‘ah. This rationale leads to the conclusion that 
innovation itself emerges through rational assumptions 
drawn from matters for which the precedent of evidence 
is lacking.
Judging by the moderate position taken by al-
Syâthibî, we could say that he was not himself reluctant 
to use reason (‘aql) as the basis for legal decisions. He, 
44 Al-Syâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, I, 146. 
45 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 133.
46 Al-Syâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, IV, p. 20.
47 Al-Syâthibî, above n 44, 26-27.
nevertheless, tried to place himself in an intermediate 
position between naql (Shariah)—immutable by virtue 
of the certitude of divine law—and reason (‘aql)—
which tends toward relativity. Elsewhere, he ascertains 
that reason is inferior to the Shariah, since the latter is 
universally certain. He repeatedly states that good and 
bad in the shariah cannot be decided solely on the basis 
of reason, since justification on the basis of reason that 
something is good or bad is relative, while the shariah 
is certain.48
As Fazlur Rahman49 noted, al-Syâthibî was convinced 
that human knowledge based on reason and experience 
cannot be trusted at all and, therefore, cannot lead to 
action. Put differently, al-Syâthibî accepted rational 
judgment if based on universal truths (kulliyyât) or 
on a multitude of probable instances or particular 
statements (juz’iyyât). One example of this is his theory 
of al-mashlahah al-mursalah which is fundamentally 
rational though based on his theory of the ends of the 
law (maqâshid al-syarî‘ah). Wael B. Hallaq50 notes that 
he even went beyond his predecessors in developing a 
legal theory of induction, by remaining faithful at the 
same time to the established theory of tawatur as the 
basis of his general theory. He nevertheless exercised 
caution by rejecting arbitrarily rational judgment which 
can ultimately lead to innovation (al-bid‘ah).
His efforts may be described as an attempt to re-
concile the two extremes represented by the shariah 
and reason, though he gave preference to the former. 
Al-Syâthibî51 acknowledged that the shariah does not 
elaborate on all rulings in detail, but gives universal 
guidance in many cases; therefore, it is left to the 
mujtahid (mujtahid haqîqi) to use his reason in the 
exercise of ijtihâd. Furthermore, al-Syâthibî believed 
that the validity of al-mashlahah al-mursalah and istih-
sân, for instance, as sources of law is unequivocal, 
though neither is explicitly referred to in the Quran 
and the Sunnah. However, their compatibility with the 
universal roots (ushûl al-kulliyyah) is obvious, in that 
they both benefit human beings in allowing them to 
perform good ordinances.52 Accordingly, the role of 
reason is the aforementioned process is indispensible. 
Al-Syâthibî, however, insists that adjudicating good 
or bad in the ‘ibâdah is the prerogative of the shariah, 
whereas in mundane affairs, where logic plays a greater 
role, reason may be favored. 
48 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, I, p. 184.
49 Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History (2nd ed, 1984), 
p. 153. 
50 Wael B Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability and 
Certainty in Sunni Legal Thought,” in Law and Legal Theory in Classical 
and Medieval Islam (1995), 30.
51 Al-Syâthibî, above n 46, 66-76.
52 Al-Syâthibî, al-Muwafaqât, IV, p. 148-58; I, p. 27-34.
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Having reviewed the legal principles held by al-
Syâthibî, we will look at the different arguments of 
other scholars which lean one way or the other in the 
contest between the Shariah and reason. Our account 
will show that al-Syâthibî is certainly more objective in 
the sense that his middle way reflects a more reasonable 
balance between the rational and the scriptural camps.
Unlike the Mâlikîtes, for whom al-mashlahah al-
mursalah could be employed as a source of law in the 
complete absence of textual indicants, the Zaharites, 
and especially Ibn Hazm, strenuously objected to such 
an approach in religious matters.53 The rigidity of Ibn 
Hazm on this topic strictly delimited the role of reason 
in understanding divine law. He equated the practice 
with ra’y (reason), basing himself on the Quranic passage 
“obey Allah and obey the messenger […] if ye have any 
disputes…[…]refer it to Allah and the messenger" (Qs. 
[4]: 59) and ‘Umar’s saying “beware the people of ra’y 
(ahl al-ra’y)” as objectionable due to the possibility of 
contradicting the divine law and creating innovation: 
how then does one resolve the nass which is still 
universal or ambiguous? And how does one negate ta‘lîl 
(ratio legis)54 which is counted as legal principle? On the 
contrary, we can argue that the Shariah is not entirely 
based on ‘ibâdah, which are certain, but also on customs 
(‘adiyyât), which have to be elaborated in conformity 
with the benefits and harms that face human beings. 
As Fazlur Rahman contends, the shariah, whether in 
the form of ‘ibâdah or mu‘âmalah (social relation), is 
not devoid of ‘illah (ratio legis), and hikmah (wisdom). 
For the Quran, he affirms, usually gives an explicit or 
implicit reason for a pronouncement when it concerns 
a moral and legal judgment or principle therefore, 
the main reason underlying legal understanding is 
hikmah, which is a bearer of benefit (al-mashlahah) for 
mankind.55
Al-Syâthibî too frequently proclaims the maqâshid 
al-syarî‘ah as universal roots (ushûl al-kulliyyât) and as a 
legal basis justifying the al-mashlahah approved in the 
practices of the companions mentioned above. Yet, he 
also turns his attention to another theory besides al-
mashlahah al-mursalah which is likewise not counted 
as innovation. This is al-istihsân (juristice preference), 
which can be utilized as a legal means. Thus while al-
bid‘ah, which is not based on the ends of law and even 
contradicts the shariah, is entirely rejected, al-istihsân 
in the eyes al-Syâthibî, which commands good is 
53 Noor-Ul-Amin Leghari, “The Malikite Doctrine of Mashlahah 
Mursala,” (MA Thesis, McGill University, 1984),  p. 91-88.
54 Leghari, “The Malikite Doctrine,” p. 84.
55 Fazlur Rahman, “Toward Reformulating the Methodology of 
Islamic Law,” New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, 12, 2, (1979) , p. 219-224.
lawful and can be adopted as a method of reasoning, 
and is espoused by al-Syâthibî himself as a tool of legal 
argument. 
Al-Bid‘ah and al-Istihsân
For al-Syâthibî, al-istihsân, in terms of literal mea-
ning i.e. to presume something to be good or bad, was 
utilized by the people of innovation (ahl al-bid‘ah) 
as their argument. Unlike pure al-istihsân, which is 
somewhat arbitrary in determining what is good or 
bad, the shariah leaves no doubt about its position. Any 
assessment of good or bad (or pure al-istihsân) in syar‘î 
matters which is not based on a certain dalîl (indicant) 
constitutes innovation  (al-al-bid‘ah al-latî tastahsin).56 
Bearing this arbitrary use of al-istihsân in mind, al-
Syâthibî nevertheless, characterizes it as a legitimate 
source of law applied in cases where the nash is silent. 
For him, the use of sound al-istihsân is not based on one’s 
own feelings or speculative reason. On the contrary, al-
istihsân espoused in Islamic jurisprudence must be seen 
from the perspective of the objective of the law giver 
(qashd al-syâri’).57 The validity of al-istihsân, according 
to him, is recognizable in cases where there is a duality 
between relying on necessity (dharûrî) on the one hand 
and using qiyâs on the other. Exclusive reliance on the 
latter in a given case may, however, lead to hardship, and 
therefore is to be avoided; instead, al-istihsân (juristic 
preference) should be used. For example, the ‘araya 
contract by which unripe dates on the palm-tree are 
bartered against their value calculated in term of edible 
dried dates, is considered lawful. If it were left to qiyâs, 
it would be unlawful, but die to great exigency and 
hardship, the solution by al-istihsân makes it lawful. In 
this particular case, al-istihsân promotes a particular al-
mashlahah in maintaining the universal dalîl (“al-akhdz 
bi-mashlahah juzi’iyyah fî muqâbalah dalîl kulli”).58 
The validity of istihsân as a legal principle was also 
defended by al-Shîrâzî (d. 476/1083). He selectively 
accepted istihsân as long as it was approved by a dalîl 
(indicant) and when the use of qiyâs was less than 
certain. He, however, rejected al-istihsân when deemed 
to be a limitation of the ‘illah (ratio legis) by a dalîl 
(takhshîsh al-‘illah bi-al-dalîl). The former is illustrated 
by the example of a person who out of forgetfulness 
proceeds to eat something when he is supposed to be 
fasting. Qiyâs (ratio legis) dictates that the fasting would 
become void, for the fundamental consideration in qiyâs 
is that food has entered his body, whether intentionally 
or not. This judgment is however abandoned on the 
56 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 136.
57 Al-Syâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, IV, p. 148-149.
58 Al-Syâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, IV, p. 149.
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basis of a Prophetic report which declares fasting to be 
valid if the eating was the result of forgetfulness. This 
prophetic report is thought to be “preferred” because it 
takes into account a text that would not otherwise have 
been employed in qiyâs and which results in a different 
rule.59   
The above example is regarded by al-Shîrâzî as a 
sound al-istihsân, given the weakness of qiyâs in this 
case. Al-Shîrâzî, however as we have seen, objects to 
limiting the ‘illah by dalîl. Al-istihsân in this case is not 
tolerated and must be regarded as unsound. In addition, 
for him, the use of istihsân is based on the prophetic 
report “what Muslims deem good, it is good before 
God” (mâ ra’âh al-Muslim hasana fa huwa ‘ind Allâh 
hasana). The report, according to al-Shîrâzî, connotes 
the goodness which may be identified through the 
consensus of ‘ulamâ’, not individual preference. Any 
justification by rational preference without a dalîl is in 
error. Qiyâs, accordingly, is only to be used as a tool if 
no explicit text pronounces on the relevant matter.60 A 
similar argument rejecting al-istihsân when it involves 
limitation of the ratio legis (takhshîsh al-‘illah) is also 
made by Sarakhsî (d. 490/1097). He cites the case of 
the difference between predatory animals and predatory 
birds. The beaks of the later are analogized as bone, 
which therefore cannot transmit impurity to the food. 
The former, however, use their tongues when eating 
and consequently transmit impurities to the food 
they consume. This example, al-Sarakhsî says, is not 
to be regarded as takhshîsh al-‘illah (the limitation of 
ratio legis) but rather as a “preferred qiyâs” (al-qiyâs al-
mustahsan). This is because, he concludes, the use of 
al-istihsân follows the Quran, the Sunnah, and pious 
predecessors.61
Contrary to one derived by analogy to the textual 
sources of the law, this legal finding needs a further 
identification clearly from the text and ends of the law. 
What is problematic in this way of law-finding is that 
the jurist has to justify why he disregards a correct ruling 
arrived at by analogical reasoning in favor of the preferred 
ruling. Critics of this procedure frequently denounce 
the ruling adopted in the name of juristic preference on 
the grounds that it is not rooted in a firm textual basis 
or a formal way of reasoning. Such decisions are often 
rejected by other jurists as being arbitrary personal 
opinions (ra’y). Al-Syâfi’î (d. 204/820) is famous for his 
dictum “who practices juristic preference, legislates.”62
59 Abû Ishâq Ibrâhîm al-Shîrâzî, Syarh al-Luma‘, ed. Abdel Majid 
Turki, 2 vols (1988) vol 2, 969; see also Hallaq, A Hitory, p. 107-111.
60 Al-Shîrâzî, Syarh al-Luma‘, p. 70-74.
61 Muhammad b. Ahmad Abû Sahl al-Sarakhsî, Ushûl al-Sarakhsî, 
ed. Abû al-Wafâ al-Afghanî, 2 vols. (al-Qâhirah: Dâr al-Kitâb al-‘Arabî, 
1373/1954), p. 204-208.
62 Felicitas Opwis,”The Construction of Madhhab Authority: 
There are many opinions among jurist scholars over 
istihsân to be used as the method of finding the rulings. 
Ibn ‘Aqîl defines al-istihsân as “abandoning of legal 
analogy due to an indicant (dalîl) stronger (aqwâ) than 
it.” This definition furthers a certain requirements that 
avoid human passions based merely on reason. He avoids 
the subjectivity of the undefined term “more appropriate” 
and emphasizes that the jurist gives preference to an 
indicant that occupies a higher rank in the hierarchy of 
legal evidence. Abû al-Khaththâb is even more specific 
in his criticism of Abû Ya‘lâ’s definition. He states that 
one ruling cannot be more appropriate or stronger than 
another, rather, only their indicants can be considered 
as such. Hence, for him juristic preference means 
abandoning a ruling derived by analogy on account of 
an indicant stronger than analogy, namely the Quran, 
the Sunnah, or consensus. Both Ibn ‘Aqîl’s and Abû al-
Khaththâb’s comments on juristic preference imply that 
they understand this methodology not as one in which 
two analogically derived rulings are contradictory but 
that the conflict is between an analogy and a quranic 
text, Sunnah, or a consensus. The preferred ruling then 
would be valid on account of its higher rank as legal 
evidence. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyyah is correct in 
portraying these three Hanbalî scholars as supporters 
of the practice of juristic preference in the sense of 
one ruling being given preference over one derived by 
analogy.63
According to Hanbalite scholars such as Ibn 
Taymiyyah sees juristic preference as an alternative way 
of finding the rulings. He opines that juristic preference 
is not contrary to a correct legal analogy that can equally 
apply to the case under consideration; rather, the ruling 
based on analogy does not apply in this instance because 
the jurist has found a textually supported ruling that 
better fits the case in question, namely the “preferred” 
ruling. He added that the difference between the two 
rulings is elucidated by textual evidence. The preferred 
ruling specifies the general ruling of the analogy in a 
manner that invalidates its application for the particular 
case.64 Such another perspective makes us a critical 
understanding that al-istihsân is quite different from al-
bid‘ah.
Al-istihsân in Mâlikîte doctrine, according to al-
Ibn Taymiyya Interpretation  of Juristic Preference (Istihsan)” (2008) 
15 Islamic Law and Society 219, 224. See also his quotation of Abû 
Hâmid Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Ghazâlî, al-Mustashfaâ min ‘Ilm 
al-Ushûl (1995), 1:254. Cf. Muhammad b. Idrîs al-Syâfi’î, al-Risâlah, 
ed. Ahmad Muhammad Syâkir (al-Qâhirah: Maktabah Dâr al-Turâts, 
1979/1399), 507, where al-Syâfi’î explicitly rejects juristic preference. 
Man istahsan fa qad syara‘a.
63 Opwis, above n 62, 226
64 Opwis,”The Construction of Madhhab Authority”, p. 233.
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Syâthibî65 is equivalent to al-mashlahah al-mursalah 
(public interest); such istihsân, therefore, is not alien to 
stipulated indicants (muqtadhâ adillah). In making such 
a statement, al-Syâthibî may have been trying to stress 
that istihsân itself is different from arbitrary rational 
judgment in instances where textual evidence is lacking, 
and therefore it is not to be counted as innovation (al-
bid‘ah). For, according to al-Syâthibî’s understanding, 
legal cases should primarily be in line with the ends 
of the law (maqâshid al-syarî‘ah) rather than with pure 
reason. The ends of the law, where necessity (dharârî) 
is a key element, depend on divine wisdom (hikmah),66 
a solid basis on which to draw when there is lack of 
conformity between qiyâs (ratio legis) on the one hand 
and al-istihsân on the other. 
As the difference between ‘ibâdah and mundane 
matters (‘awâ’id) is fundamental point in al-Syâthibî’s 
view, the function of al-istihsân in these two domains 
has to be treated separately. As we have seen ‘ibâdah are 
considered perfect in Islamic law as well as impossible 
to justify on the sole basis of reason. Mundane matters, 
however, are not only rationally understandable but 
they may also change in accordance with time, place 
and condition. Al-Syâthibî, therefore, tolerates the 
use of al-istihsân in mundane matters insofar as the 
dalîl neither stipulates nor contradicts the shariah. 
Employing al-istihsân in the shariah without any dalîl is 
categorized as innovation (al-bid‘ah), for in al-Syâthibî’s 
words, not every al-istihsân is true.67 The cases of al-
istihsân which al-Syâthibî rejected appear to have been 
efforts at using pure reason to judge actions as good or 
bad without a dalîl. On the contrary, if al-istihsân is 
ruled as conforming to a certain dalîl, it is lawful.
Ibn ‘Arabî, as quoted by al-Syâthibî, defines al-
istihsân as setting aside a certain dalil temporarily on the 
condition that hardship is present or as an exceptional 
solution when the laws applying to a certain case am-
biguous; on the one hand applying a particular legal 
norm can lead to difficulty, while on the other the 
reduction of hardship is of prime importance. For these 
reasons, al-istihsân can be applied as law in the following 
instances: first, in matters of ‘urf (local custom); second, 
in al-mashlahah; third, in order to ease human burdens; 
and fourth, to eliminate hardship. Ibn Rusyd, moreover, 
characterizes al-istihsân as abandoning qiyâs where 
reliance solely on the latter may lead to transgression 
of the law.68
Having elaborated the issue of al-istihsân as it is 
65 Al-Syâthibî, Al-Muwâfaqât, IV, p. 151.
66 Hallaq,”Inductive Corroboration,” p. 28.
67 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, 136. He said, “Lays kull al-istihsân 
haqq”
68 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 138-139.
treated by these two Andalusian-born scholars, al-
Syâthibî concludes that al-istihsân is in conformity 
with the universal indicants (adillah, sing. dalîl) of the 
shariah insofar as no clear dalil from the Quran or the 
Sunnah is expressed. Indicants function to bring clarity 
to words which have a plethora of meanings such as 
when the meaning of the Quran is specified by the 
Sunnah. Al-Syâthibî agrees that reason can be employed 
to interpret the Shariah when used in conjunction with 
al-istihsân. He, however, rejected the use of al-istihsân 
where rational judgment is allowed to dominate the 
shariah. This is because the Companions, he insists, only 
employed reason if there was no clear indicant from the 
nash and only by referring it to their understanding of 
the roots of the shariah. They never came to the point of 
saying, ”I decided this because my mind tended towards 
this conclusion”.69 The subjectivity of pure al-istihsân, 
al-Syâthibî states, lies in the fact that decisions as to 
what is good or bad in the human mind may change 
depending on purposes and conditions. This was 
evidenced by the people of innovation who rejected the 
search for truth in the shariah. They resented the people 
of science (ahl al-‘ilm) because of the latter’s consistency 
in applying the shariah.70        
Just as reason is a subjective factor in pronouncing 
syar‘î matters, al-Syâthibî also doubts the validity of 
the heart (qalb) when used as a measure to justify good 
or bad in the sight of the shariah. Arguing against the 
Prophetic report “ask your heart” (istafti qalbak), he 
declared he could not see a third facet to the Shariah 
other than the Quran and the Sunnah. Any third means 
of justifying good or bad, he insists, probably refers to 
those issues which are beyond religious concerns.71
Al-Syâthibî’s rejection of the heart’s judgment when 
the nash is silent is based on four considerations. First, 
where a case arises for which no certain nash can be 
found, the judgment should be based on a relevant 
indicant (dalîl) as derived from the Shariah. A fatwa 
al-qalb (asking the legal decision to the heart), however, 
cannot be used as a dalîl. Second, all the cases disputed 
by Muslims should be referred to the Quran and the 
Sunnah, not the fatwa of the heart. Third, it is agreed 
among Muslims that cases which are not solved should 
be referred to the people of knowledge (ahl al-dzikr). 
Finally, al-Syâthibî draws the conclusion that every man 
should his lesson from God’s signs in conformity with 
His indicant in the Quran.72
69 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 150.
70 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 151.
71 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, p. 157.
72 Al-Syâthibî, al-I‘tishâm, II, 157-158. For final remark, al-Syâthibî 
insists on the rectitude of God’s oneness through understanding with 
God’s sign from the Quran, not from the heart. In that, he quotes the 
Quranic verse saying, “do they not look at the camel- how they are 
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Al-Syâthibî’s consistency in championing the su-
premacy of the shariah is not only reflected in his 
concept of al-bid‘ah, but it also conveyed in his effort 
to preserve the authenticity of the shariah from any 
deviation. Al-Syâthibî even goes beyond the boundary 
of his madzhab, that is Mâlikîte school of law, but 
rather has accommodated some credible and valid 
approaches from other school, i.e. Hanafîte madzhab, 
to the extent it is in line with the spirit of shariah. 
Unlike al-Syâfi’î (d. 204/820) who rejected altogether 
al-istihsân, al-Syâthibî accepted al-istihsân insofar as it 
was in line with the indicants and rejected those who 
treated religious matters on the basis of pure al-istihsân 
(reason). Al-Syâfi‘î, on the other hand, rejected al-
istihsân on the ground that it is similar to indulging 
pleasure (taladzdzudz).73 
In addition, al-Syâfi‘î sees istihsân as equivalent 
to ra’y (opinion) and hence cannot tolerate it. Legal 
judgment in the shariah, according to him, can only be 
based on the Quran and the Sunnah, ijmâ’ (consensus) 
and qiyâs (ratio legis). To admit opinion not based on 
these sources means accepting the reasoning of non-
specialists.74 It is reasonable to assume that al-Syâfi‘î was 
playing it safe when he rejected istihsân by equating it 
with ra’y (opinion). This position, which he espoused in 
the latter half of his career, was probably inspired by a 
wish to condemn those in “the ancient schools”75 and 
those among his contemporaries who were too free in 
their use of reason. In other words, al-Syâfi‘î’s polemics 
are obviously against al-istihsân and arbitrary ijtihâd 
and in favor of disciplined qiyâs as a corrective for those 
who juxtaposed reason and the shariah. Yet, al-Syâfi‘î 
was ultimately forced to recognize that one has to make 
decisions on points of detail for which there is no clear 
evidence from the nash.76     
In short, ra’y, which is significant as an expression 
of rationalist and utilitarian tendencies, was wholly 
opposed by al-Syâfi‘î; this was what fuelled his 
vehement opposition to al-istihsân. Nevertheless, while 
the unequivocally insisted on the overriding status of 
the Quran and the Sunnah, he still tolerated certain 
elements of ra’y and moulded them into arguments 
that could be used in the law, but only insofar as they 
created?” (Q. 88: 17)
73 Muhammad b. Idrîs al-Syâfi’î, al-Risâlah, ed. Muhammad Sayyid 
Kaylâni, (al-Qâhirah: Musthafâ al-Bâb al-Halabî,1969), 220.
74 Joseph Schacht, the Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence ( 
1950), 121.
75 This statement used by Schacht is to indicate al-Syâfi’î’s critique 
against his predecessor’s position in using reason. Schacht notes that 
al-Syâfi’î in his earliest period uses ra’y in the same loose way as the 
ancient schools. Schacht, however, does not elaborate in detail which 
the ancient school belonging to. But it is probably directly to Hanafite 
and Mu’tazilite schools. Schacht, above n 74, 120.
76 Schacht, above n 74, 20
derived their premises from revelation.77 Al-Syâthibî, 
on the other hand, accepted al-istihsân as long as it did 
not deviate from the indicants of the shariah. Following 
the example of Mâlik,78 the eponymous founder of 
his school, al-Syâthibî deemed its suitability to be 
unquestionable, provided its injunctions in syar‘î matters 
are not based on personal judgment or speculation. The 
sound al-istihsân which al-Syâthibî agreed with had the 
characteristic of relying upon the end of the law-giver 
(qashd al-Syâri’), such as setting aside qiyâs (ratio legis) 
in favor of a stronger al-mashlahah or to avert a greater 
danger. Such al-istihsân is seen, al-Syâthibî states, from 
the fact that its efficacy clearly promotes the ends of 
the shariah, dharûrî (necessity), hajjî (need) and tahsînî 
(improvement). This is because, according to him, in 
some cases reliance on a rule merely on the basis of 
qiyâs (ratio legis) might give rise to some sort of harmful 
consequence for human beings. Al-Syâthibî, however, 
is still convinced that it can be undertaken in perfect 
consistency with the foundational texts and without 
any intrusion of merely human proclivities (dzawq).79 
Having discussed the differences between al-bid‘ah 
(innovation) and al-istihsân and istishlâh as perceived 
by al-Syâthibî, we can say that his aim was, on the one 
hand, to preserve the authenticity of the shariah, and 
on the other to ensure that the role of reason is well 
defined in line with the spirit of the law. The sound 
al-istihsân, for instance is regarded by al-Syâthibî as 
one means of performing ijtihâd. This legal principle, 
however, can be used on the condition that conflicting 
indicators exist. Al-istihsân itself, we assume is procedure 
rather than an indicator in its own right; al-‘Âmidî (d. 
630/1232) after all refers to it as tarjîh al-adillah (the 
preponderance of the indicants).80 The pure istihsân 
however, if used arbitrarily, can lead to the subjectivity 
of human judgment. While the shariah is deemed as the 
superior reference for legal injunctions, the people of 
innovation (ahl al-al-bid‘ah) take the opposite position 
by using istihsân on the basis of pure reason to justify 
al-bid‘ah practices.81 
Both the violence of al-bid‘ah and the rejection of 
77 Hallaq, ”Was al-Shafi‘i the Master Architect of Islamic Juris-
prudence,”  597.
78 Mâlik b. Anas as quoted by al-Syâthibî designates that istihsan 
is deemed as nine-tenth of human knowledge. Mâlik’s characteristic 
statement grasps the true essence of istihsân as a method of finding 
better and more equitable alternatives to existing problems both within 
and beyond the confines of qiyâs (ratio legis). Al-Syâthibî, al-Itishâm, 
II, 138. 
79 Al-Syâthibî, al-Muwâfaqât, IV, 148-149. See also Bernard G 
Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (1998) , 187. 
80 Bernard G Weiss, The Search for God’s Law (1992), 673.
81 Ahmad Haris,” Innovation and Tradition in Islam: A Study on 
Bid‘a as Interpretation of the Religion in the Indonesian Experience,” 
(PhD. Diss., Temple University, 1998), p. 233.
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pure al-istihsân (reason were also proclaimed by the 
Syrian-born reformist thinker Muhammad Rasyîd Ri-
dhâ (d. 19350. Prefacing his position on al-bid‘ah and 
arbitrary reason, Ridhâ points out that opinions on 
legal matters can be divided into three categories: first, 
the valid, second the invalid, and third the ambiguous 
opinion. Of these we are most concerned with the second 
one. In spite of his censure against al-bid‘ah, which he 
regarded as invalid or evil opinion, Ridhâ convincingly 
rejects arguments based solely on assumptions of good 
or bad (pure al-istihsân) in syar‘î matters. Al-istihsân, he 
insists, which is not based on sound qiyâs (ratio legis) 
or which fails to promote al-mashlahah or avert danger 
is counted as unsound al-istihsân, and therefore foreign 
to the Shariah.82
Closing Remarks
As the ends of the law (maqâshid al-syarî‘ah) are 
the hallmark and characteristic of al-Syâthibî’s legal 
theory, the validity of al-mashlahah al-mursalah and 
al-istihsân is tied to this concept. These two methods 
of reasoning are essentially different from pure reason. 
Moreover, al-bid‘ah strictly speaking is inferior to these 
two legal principles. In my opinion, al-bid‘ah absolutely 
disregards the ends of the law in favor of pure rational 
judgment. While the syar‘î matters is clear, al-Syâthibî 
is in faithful with the superiority of the nash over 
reason. Over the cases dealing with mundane matters, 
al-Syâthibî tolerates rational judgment as the means of 
way solution insofar as it is in accordance with human 
welfare and averts danger. []
Bibliography
Ali, Aslam Farouk, “A Translation of Muhammad al-
Ghazali’s Study on Bid’a with an Introduction on 
Author and His Thought” (MA Thesis at University 
of South Africa, 2010). 
Âmidî, al-, Abû al-Hasan ‘Ali Sayf al-Dîn, al-Ihkâm fî 
Usûl al-Ahkâm, 4 vols, al-Qâhirah: Mathba’ah ‘Ali 
Subayh, 1968.
Friedman, Yohanan, Syaykh Ahmad Sirhindi: An Outline 
of His Thought and A Study of His Image in the Eyes 
of Posterity (1971).
Ghazâlî, al-, Abû Hâmid Muhammad b. Muhammad, 
al-Mustashfâ min ‘ilm al-ushûl (1995).
Hallaq, Wael B, “On Inductive Corroboration, Pro-
82 Muhammad Rashîd Ridhâ, Yusr al-Islâm wa Ushûl al-Tasyrî’ al-
Âmm, (al-Qâhirah: Mathba‘ah Nahdhah Mishr, 1956), 42-43, 72. In 
this case, Ridah seemingly treads the footsteps of al-Syâthibî in treating 
al-istihsân as both sound and unsound. The former is counted as valid, 
while the latter is invalid, and the rational judgment is dominant. In 
the latter, the innovation frequently espoused unsound al-istihsân of 
his/her justification.  
bability and Certainty in Sunni Legal Thought,” 
in Law and Legal Theory in Classical and Medieval 
Islam, Aldershot: Variorum, 1995.
-------------, ”Was al-Shafi‘i the Master Architect of 
Islamic Jurisprudence,” in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 25, 1993.
-------------, A History of  Islamic Legal Theories An 
Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Haris, Ahmad, Innovation and Tradition in Islam: A 
Study on Al-bid‘ah as Interpretation of the Religion 
in the Indonesian Experience, PhD. Diss., Temple 
University, 1998.
‘Izz al-Dîn b. ‘Abd al-Salâm, Qawâ‘id al-Ahkâm fi 
Mashâlih al-Anâm, 4 vols. al-Qâhirah: Matba‘ah al-
Istiqamah, n.d.
Jâbiri, al-, Muhammad ‘Abîd, al-Dîn wa al-Dawlah 
wa Tathbîq al-Syarî‘ah, Bayrût: Markaz Dirâsah al-
Wahdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1996. 
Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 
1991.
Leghari, Noor-Ul-Amin, “The Malikite Doctrine of 
Mashlahah Mursala” (MA Thesis, McGill University, 
1984).  
Lubis, Nazly Hanum, ”al-Tufi’s Concept of Al-mash-
lahah: A Study in Islamic Legal Theory,” (MA Thesis, 
McGill University, 1995).
Martin, Richard C, R Mark Woodward, and Dwi S 
Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam Mu‘tazilism 
from Medieval School to Modern Symbol (1997).
Khwarazmî, al-, Muhammad b. Ahmad Mafâtîh al-
‘Ulûm, ed. G. van Vloten, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1895.
Opwis, Felicitas, ”Maslaha in Contemporary Islamic 
Legal Theory” (2005) 12(2) Islamic Law and Society 
182.
-------------, ”The Construction of Madhhab Authority: 
Ibn Taymiyya Interpretation  of Juristic Preference 
(Istihsân)” (2005) Islamic Law and Society 15.
Rahman, Fazlur, “Toward Reformulating the Methodo-
logy of Islamic Law,” (1979) New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 219.
-------------, Islamic Methodology in History (2nd Edition, 
1984). 
Ridhâ, Muhammad Rasyîd, Yusr al-Islâm wa Ushûl 
al-Tasyrî al-‘Âm, al-Qâhirah: Mathba‘ah Nahdha 
Misrh, 1956. 
Rispler, Vardit, “Toward a New Understanding of the 
Term Al-bid‘ah,” Der Islam, 68, 2, 1991. 
Sarakhsi, al-, Muhammad b. Ahmad Abû Sahl, Ushûl 
al-Sarakhsî, ed. Abû al-Wafâ al-Afghânî, 2 vols. al-
Qâhirah:Dâr al-Kitâb al-‘Arabî, 1373/1954.
Schacht, Joseph, The Origins of Muhammadan Juris-
Ahkam: Vol. XII No.1 Januari 201214
prudence, Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1950.
Shabana, Ayman, “‘Urf and ‘Âdah within the Framework 
al-Syâthibî’s Legal Methodology, UCLA Journal of 
Islamic and Near Eastern Law Review, 87 (2007): 
87-100.
Shîrâzî, al-, Abû Ishâq Ibrâhîm, Syarh al-Luma‘, ed. 
Abdel Majid Turki, 2 vols, Bayrût: Dâr al-Gharb al-
Islâmî, 1988. 
Syâfi’î, al-, Muhammad b. Idrîs, al-Risâlah, ed. Muham-
mad Sayyid Kaylâni, al-Qâhirah: Musthafâ al-Bâb 
al-Halabi,1969.
Syalabî, Muhammad Musthafâ, Ta‘lîl  al-Ahkâm, al-
Qâhirah: Mathba‘ah al-Azhâr, 1947.
Syâthibî, al-, Ibrâhîm b. Mûsâ, al-I‘tishâm, ed. Muham-
mad Rasyîd Ridhâ, 2 vols. al-Qâhirah: Maktabah al-
Tijâriyyah al-Kubrâ, n. d. 
-------------, al-Muwafaqât fî Ushûl al-Syarî‘ah, 4 vols. 
al-Qâhirah: Dâr al-Fikr al-‘Arabî, n. d.
Tûfî, al-, Najm al-Dîn, Sharh Mukhtashar al-Rawdhah, 
ed. ‘Abd Allâh b. ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Turkî, 3 vols., 
Bayrût: Mu’assasah al-Risâlah, 1989.
Ubaydî, al-, Hammâdî, al-Syâthibî wa Maqâsid al-
Shari‘a, Tripoli: al-Jamâhir al-‘Uzmâ, 1992.
Weiss, Bernard G, The Search for God’s Law, Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 1992.
-------------, The Spirit of Islamic Law, Athens: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1998. 
